I have been asked before what philosophy was. Often times, I don't not know what to answer. I could answer what philosophers do today. Although problematic in its own right, this appears easier to explain. Today, philosophers are sometimes hard to differentiate from scientists and "physicists" (what I call a physicist is someone who develops a theory about a part of nature [physis] - he can be a biologist, a sociologist, or string theory scientist). If anything, we can differentiate a philosopher in a lot of domains by their method: while a scientist will no doubt have resort to experiments and factual interpretations, a philosopher usually hovers slightly above that discourse. A philosopher is a specialist of "conceptual" problems (things that don't quite add up in the physicist's book that need clearing out conceptually).
But there remains an activity that is foncièrement philosophical. I name metaphysics. Metaphysics is often adequated to ontology - the science of being ("science" is not to be understood in the sense of "experimental science" but in the sense of research, knowledge). Being as being itself - not that book on the table, or that idea I have, but being in itself. This is in line with the conception of ancient philosophers which eventually came to bare the name of metaphysics (the history of the name is itself very interesting...). But of course, there is also an epistemic dimension which is also introspective, and that has it's roots within each one of us. (...)
For this reason, the structure of the metaphysical problem is recursive. This is fundamental. It also comes an unquenchable human thirst for knowledge, for understanding "how" and "what", as Aristotle noted.
Let's have an example to illustrate those properties.
Dan is a physicist. 1. Dan entertains a thought about a flower. Dan wonders how that flower is possible. Dan develops Botanics. 2. Dan then entartains a thought about Botanics. How can he be developing a theory about a flower? Dan therefore reflects about his own thought about that flower. Dan comes up with a theory of psychology to explain his thought about the flower and how he came to perceive it through his brain and senses and make a theory about it. 3. Dan entertains a thought about his theory of psychology and his the validity of his understanding of it. He wonders how it is possible to develop a theory of psychology in the first place. Dan therefore develops epistemology. 4. Dan is now confounded. Dan wonders if he can withdraw himself from the system to observe himself objectivily in thinking about the flower, about Botanics, about psychology and about epistemology. Dan develops metaphysics.
Even though further cycles are possible, metaphysics is seen here as an endpoint: it encompasses the whole reflexion. In a way, you cannot surpass metaphysics because if you do, you are still within the metaphysical reflection (this is why many philosophers have called metaphysics "the science of all other sciences", "philosophie première", etc). However, it is wrong to see it as a reductionist basis upon which all other sciences would attack themselves - like logic wanted to be at the beginning of last century. It is not the case unless you are aristotelician and reject the subjective turn all metaphysical enquiries have taken after Descartes. Rather, metaphysics is necessary to any and all activity of reason.
Now, an external objective observer may want to interject and say "look, what you have described is really simple; I can draw the structure of your above reasoning on a piece of paper which will explain exhaustively and precisely what you are describing". However, as can be clearly seen, this additional step taken by the objective observer is just another recursion into our development and is still calling on another level of discourse.
This has lead to different answers by different people who have encountered this problem. There is the sceptical, the mystical, the nihilist or the realist position. Balkin says that there is nothing "mystical" about self-reference. His answer is the ambiguity principle: we inscribe ourselves within one point of the reflective process and must go along with the best available explanation of what we are looking it. Similarly, I think it was Leibniz who said that questions must stop somewhere. In both cases, the remark that we must stand somewhere and satisfy ourselves with what we have. But their two views are diverging in their conception of knowledge: to Balkin, it is soft, almost rortian in nature. To Leibniz, some knowledge is eternal and unperishable ("true in all worlds").
Balkin rejects any strong postulate of being, of true being. Leibniz on the other hand is amongst the "proper metaphysicians" - those who believe that truth and being exist. They could answer to Balkin's position that it is contradictory: there is something that exists, even if it was only your negation that existed. This strikes me as an eristical argument. Thankfully, that seems to be the position of my teacher Obadachian (it is always more interesting to be confronted to the opposite opinion). I will listen to him and hopefully he can "show me the way" (there is something undeniably esoteric and initiatic about the metaphysical problem - we see this in ancient times and also from modern philosophers who remind us metaphysics must begin with oneself). However, even tho Obadachian thinks he can "one up" the realists (or however you want to call those who reject the reality of being), I feel like another realist can be lurking around just waiting to one up him in turn: this follows from the recursive nature of the problem.
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Is this problem a "western" problem? We see it in Parmenide, and right up to our modern times. But is it something that is contingent to our culture? I believe not. To the core of the problem is an emotion, an étonnement. This étonnement goes like this: "OMFG there is something!" The greeks spoke of this emotion as being the reason for philosophy. Kant said that this emotion is a human trait (throwing himself in yet another recursive counterpoint) and that all before him just couldn't resolve the issue. He then undertook to resolve the issue aporectically.
Yet this problematic may only be novel in it's attempt to solve it: through Science. This étonnement howerver, I believe, is encountered in many other cultures which have however give to it "religious" answers. I am thinking of buddhism and zenism particularly. The theology of christianism however was dogmatic and artistotelician in nature. Buddhism is more akin to greek scepticism: suspension of judgement and abandonment.
The bridge between east and west is a common root. It simply took different roads.
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Sketch of an article.
Historical perspecitve (Plato/Aristotle, Leibniz. The possibility that the same problem reiterates itself every century, but in what way exactly)
A modern example: Balkin (Physicist = meme theory, his metaphysical positioning = ambiguity)
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A solution: what can we do? Can Godel's theorem tell us something. But this "something" is some being in itself. Can we transcend this? What about lvls? Grounds of comparison? Can we augment Balkin's theory?
Analysis of Aristotle's lieu. A close look at Balkin's take, the physicist's take, the mystic's take, the sceptic/nihilist's take. Any other lieus? Can we transcent lieus?
The doom of Étonnement. Sombrance dans l'irrationalité. Explication du romantisme.
